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1 Introduction
Social capital is an important determinant in explaining differences in economic growth.
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) have shown for a cross-section of
countries that countries with higher levels of social capital have experienced higher GDP
growth rates. It is however not clear how social capital improves economic outcomes. For
example, Dasgupta (2003) argues that social capital can have an impact on interpersonal
network formation which increases human capital, but also on the nature of public goods
which increases total factor productivity. Both channels are likely to increase GDP growth
rates, but policy implications are different.
The idea that social capital improves economic outcomes is appealing, but it is neces-
sary to identify a third factor through which social capital improves outcomes. This paper
shows that innovation is an important channel by which social capital improves economic
growth. The idea is that social capital is formed by historical institutions, such as early
literacy, past political institutions and universities. More advanced historical institutions
have established a higher level of social cohesion which has improved social capital. Social
capital in turn influences the R&D process because the financing of risky but innovative
projects involves relatively high levels of trust among researchers and capital providers.
When levels of trust are higher, more potentially successful projects will be submitted
and carried out, which improves innovation outcomes by means of more patents. Finally,
higher innovation output yields higher economic growth.
In the empirical analysis we use 102 regions from the EU-14 countries (Luxembourg is
excluded). This set of regions ensures that we take into account a relatively homogeneous
set of countries that have operated under similar judicial and economic rules for some time
now. Hence, variability in current formal institutions is likely to be a minor importance
when investigating regional differences in economic performance. This is an important
advantage of our data since the results presented by Knack and Keefer (1997) are based
on a set of countries including next to OECD member states also countries such as India,
South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey and a number of South-American countries that seem to be
hard to compare in terms of economic conditions and institutions.
We use information from the European Social Surveys (ESS) and the European Values
Surveys (EVS) to obtain measures of social capital. Innovation indicators come from
Eurostat’s regional database, which contains information on the number of R&D workers
and the number of patent applications. Economic growth is measured as GDP per capita
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growth.
The empirical analysis consists of three steps. We first establish a causal link between
social capital and economic growth. Running growth regressions using historical institu-
tions as instruments for social capital results in robust and significant positive effects of
social capital on economic growth. These estimates are consistent with the estimates from
the literature (see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) for an overview). Next, we estimate the
relationship between innovation output and social capital, by using the relative number
of patent applications as the dependent variable. Again we instrument social capital by
using information about historical institutions. The estimates suggest that higher levels
of social capital yield higher levels of innovation. Finally, we apply a 3SLS strategy to
estimate how historical institutions influence current social capital, which in turn has an
impact on innovation, which is a determinant of economic growth. Of course, social cap-
ital is also entered directly to address a possible direct link between social capital and
economic growth. The 3SLS estimates suggest a strong effect of innovation on economic
growth through social capital, and only a weak direct effect of social capital on economic
growth. The estimates suggest that social capital is a determinant of innovation, which in
turn explains on average approximately 15 percent of economic growth in the EU regions
between 1990 and 2002.
There are several relationships in our setup that need discussion. First, the relationship
between historical institutions and social capital is discussed in Tabellini (2005). He shows
for European regions that current culture is shaped by historical institutions in the period
from 1600 to 1850. Research along similar lines by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) reveals that early
institutions are important determinants of current outcomes.
Second, it is impossible to define the nature of R&D ex ante, which makes forming
expectations regarding the result of the R&D challenging (e.g., Jones and Williams, 2000).
This element of risk involved in R&D projects may show up in different ways. The investor
may be unwilling to invest simply because of the higher relative probability of failure of
the emerging innovation. In more complex scenarios, information asymmetries and moral
hazard problems may severely hinder the financing of R&D. For instance, Leland and Pyle
(1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that investors are not fully able to differentiate
between “good” and “bad” R&D projects that might constrain firms to attract external
funding. Distinguishing lemons might become easier if the firm reveals the true quality
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of the R&D project. On the one hand, firms may disclose technological information and
enable investors to assess the R&D project more easily. But, this information might
be useful to other competitors and eventually decrease the private returns of the firm.
Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) show that, when the firm is large enough, it may choose
to finance R&D projects internally to avoid this cost. Yet, for most innovative firms such
costs are unavoidable. On the other hand, firms may reveal the quality of the project
by investing more in it (in terms of using own financial resources or increasing effort).
Signaling in this way would also produce a welfare loss resulting from investment in one’s
own project beyond the point that would be optimal if the true quality of the project could
be communicated without incurring costs. Nevertheless, R&D projects may be financed
by outside capitalists, at the risk of firms misusing the funds made available by the third
party. Of course one straightforward way to overcome such a problem is to monitor the
firm (or the research unit) and to control whether the firm is investing in R&D rather than
misusing the funds.1 However, high monitoring cost may also make investors hesitant to
invest in R&D projects as shown by Boocock and Woods (1997). Given that venture
capital markets are critical for innovation (e.g., Kortum and Lerner, 2000), higher levels
of social capital may alleviate these problems and yield higher innovation output by
i) Preventing egoistic behavior : This is mainly achieved through the enforcement of
informal norms. For instance firms with “bad” projects may cease to mimic firms with
“good” projects because of the fear that this will affect their reputation.
ii) Changing expectations: Investors may finance an R&D project by considering the
reputation of the firm. For example, if a firm displays a reputable character by signaling
the true quality of its projects for a certain period, this would increase the trustworthiness
of the firm in the eyes of the investors. Investors may change their expectations regarding
the firm, which would increase the probability of financing the R&D project.
iii) Reducing transaction costs: Supposedly, if the relation between the financier and
the firm is characterized by trust, monitoring costs are low. Hence, an environment of
trust would reduce monitoring costs. By the same token, it may reduce the costs incurred
by the financier to gather information about the quality of firms and the projects.
These channels compose our link from social capital to innovation.
The final relationship is the one between innovation and economic growth. There is a
1Bougheas (2004) shows that there are strong incentives for banks to monitor their clients in such cases.
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long tradition in the economic literature, trying to explain the relationship between inno-
vation and economic growth starting from Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) and summarized
in Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) and Aghion and Howitt
(1998). The general message is that if there is no technological progress economic growth
ceases.
Our analysis is related to a number of recent papers investigating the relationship
between regional innovation and economic outcomes in the member states of the European
Union. Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) analyze whether policies to foster R&D
are paying off but do not find strong correlations between innovation performance and
economic growth. Gambardella, Mariani, and Torrisi (2002) find that patents, employment
density and openness affect labor productivity in European regions. However, these papers
do not take into account social-economic variation in terms of social capital and trust,
which affect the capacity to perform R&D. Two other papers address the relationship
between trust and regional economic growth. Moesen, Van Puyenbroeck, and Cherchye
(2000) and Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005) find that higher levels of social capital in
a region are positively correlated with economic growth in the most recent period. These
papers do not analyze how social capital is transformed into growth but stop at the level
of establishing correlations.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the data and descriptive
statistics. In Section 3 we explain our empirical strategy. Section 4 contains the estimates
and robustness and stability analyzes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptives
The data span 14 EU countries divided into 102 regions defined according to the the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). We excluded Canarias (ES7),
Ciudad Autonoma de Ceuta (ES63), Ciudad Autonoma de Melilla (ES64), Aland (FI2),
Departments D’outre-mer (FR9), Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (ITD1), Provincia Au-
tonoma Trento (ITD2), Luxembourg (LU), Regiao Autonoma dos Ac¸ores (PT2) and Re-
giao Autonoma da Madeira (PT3) due to limited data availability. For Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
the NUTS1 definition is used and for Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Sweden NUTS2
definition is applied.
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2.1 Social Capital
Measures of social capital are not without controversy. The fundamental premise behind
the value-added contributions of social capital is that it complements traditional resources
(physical capital, human capital, etc.) with other resources (social networks, trust, norms
and values, etc.) to produce better outcomes (e.g., Coleman, 1988). Indeed, from an
economist’s point of view the beneficial impacts arise only in cases where social capital
affects expectations. Granovetter (1985) stresses the networks of (social) relations in es-
tablishing expectations to generate trust to create and enforce norms. In a similar vein,
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argue that social capital yields positive externalities, which
are achieved through shared values, norms and trust that affect expectations and behavior.
However, it is not easy to come up with a social capital indicator capturing the above as-
pects. The empirical social capital literature focuses on explaining differences in economic
growth and has benefited from “generalized trust” as a proxy for social capital, which
measures the degree of opportunistic behavior (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and
Knack, 2001). Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1258) argue that trust “reflects the percentage
of people in a society who expect that most others will act cooperatively in a prisoner’s
dilemma context”.
With this in mind, our main social capital indicator (trust) comes from the first round
of European Social Surveys (ESS) conducted in 2002, a database designed to measure
change and persistence of people’s social and demographic characteristics, attitudes and
values. The original data are adjusted by population weights to reduce the possibility of
complications that might arise due to over-sampling. The indicator trust is constructed
from the answer to the following statement: “Most people can be trusted or you can’t
be too careful”. The answer category ranges from (0) “you can’t be too careful”to (10)
“most people can be trusted”, with nine levels in between. The scores range from 1.67
[Cantabria, ES13] to 7.05 [Denmark, DK0] with an average (std. dev.) of 4.88 (0.78) for
all 102 regions. Aggregating regions to countries reveals that trust is highest in Denmark
and lowest in Greece as can be seen from the first column in Table 1.
Previous studies mostly employed a trust indicator from the first round of European
Values Study (EVS) conducted in 1990, in which the respondents were asked, “generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people”(trust0 ).2 The interviewees were given two choices: (i) most people
2The European Values Survey (EVS) is designed to measure fundamental values and norms in ordinary
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can be trusted or (ii) you can’t be too careful. The ESS measure is preferred because
respondents can choose a level on a 0-10 likert scale.3 The two trust scores from EVS
and ESS are highly correlated as can be seen in Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient (0.65)
is significant at the one percent level). Even though trust0 is not available for all the
EU-14 countries it is apparent that the both trust indicators, trust and trust0, reveal
that the northern European countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark are
characterized by higher generalized trust scores when compared to the southern European
countries (cf. Table 1, the first two columns). In the next section we will report estimates
for both trust indicators.
2.2 Innovation, Performance and Education
The innovation, education and economic performance measures are taken from Eurostat’s
regional database. We use two main indicators of innovation: Patent data to measure
innovation output and R&D intensity to capture inputs.
We define the “total number of patent applications to the European Patent Office
(EPO) by year of filing excluding patent applications to the National Patent Offices in
Europe” per million inhabitants as a proxy for innovation output. These figures might
not reflect the true regional innovative potential, but it reflects “commercially significant
innovations at the world’s technological frontier” (e.g., Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002).
Patents are an imperfect proxy for regional innovativeness (e.g., Pavitt, 1982, 1988), but
are the only well-established source reflecting innovative activity (Trajtenberg, 1990). To
avoid yearly fluctuations we use a three-year average around each point in time, so that
pat91 is the average of patent applications per million population in 1990, 1991 and 1992;
and similarly pat00 is the average of patent applications per million population in 1999,
2000 and 2001.
Our patent indicator reveals the following. First, the indicator displays considerable
differences between regions, which also holds at the country level (see Table 1, the third
life such as, social-economic life, politics, family, marriage, religion etc. Unfortunately, the first round
of EVS in 1990 covers only 13 European countries (not covering regions of Austria, Greece, Finland,
Luxembourg and former East Germany).
3EVS incorporates two other trust questions, (i) trust in country citizens, and (ii) trust in family. They
are both measured on a 1-5 scale, (1) representing ‘trust them completely’ and (5) representing ‘do not
trust them at all’. When we revert these scale so that higher scores would reflect higher trust, the mean
(std. dev.) of trust in family, 4.73 (0.16), is much higher than trust in country citizens, 3.59 (0.30) for
72 EU regions. However, the latter also measures generalized trust akin to the trust measure employed
by previous studies (trust0 ). This reveals that the respondents’ perceptions are clearly different in each
question, which can be seen as evidence that the trust question measures “generalized trust”.
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of fourth column). The patent applications per million inhabitants in 1991 range from
0.6 [Centro, PT16] to 281.1 [Baden-Wurttemberg, DE1], with a mean (std. dev.) of 58.3
(61.6). In 2000, it ranges from 1.8 [Kentriki Ellada, GR2] to 570.4 [Stockholm, SE01] with
a mean (std. dev.) of 116.1 (124.4), which indicates that the differential is persistent in
the 10-year period. Another observation is that patent applications of an average northern
EU country such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden are almost ten times higher than an
average southern EU country such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. Also, there seems to be
convergence in patent applications over the 1990s, illustrated by a negative unconditional
correlation of -0.589 (significant at 1 percent level) between the growth rate of patents
between 1991-2000 and log of patents in 1991. This relationship is presented in Figure 2.
The horizontal axis measures the number of patent applications per million inhabitants
and the vertical axis measures the growth of applications between 1991 and 2000.
R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation input. R&D intensity is defined as the
percentage R&D personnel employment in total employment in the business enterprize
sector in 1995.4 This measure ranges from 0.06 [Valle D’Aosta, ITC2] to 3.53 [Stockholm,
SE01], with a mean (std. dev.) of 1.16 (0.68). As displayed in Table 1, higher R&D
intensity is generally associated with more patent applications. The correlation between
our R&D measure and patent measure equals 0.748 in 1991 and 0.766 in 2000, both
significant at the 1 percent level.
We measure economic performance by the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita between 1990 and 2002. The data suggest convergence in economic
performance over the 1990s because the correlation between the growth rate of per capita
GDP and initial GDP is -0.701, which suggests that lagging regions in 1990 are catching-up
in the last decade. This relationship is presented in Figure 3.
Finally, we capture human capital as the share of tertiary level students (levels 5, 6
and 7) in all students in 1993, according to the International Standard Classification of
Education 1976 (ISCED76) definitions. It is interesting to see that even in terms of human
capital there are significant differences between European regions and countries. The final
column in Table 1 shows that Finland and Belgium have the highest proportion of tertiary
students, while Ireland and the United Kingdom are among the lowest in our sample.
4Information on other measures, such as R&D expenditures, is not available for the full sample (more
than 15 regions are missing). We also could not employ earlier years because of the same problem. However,
we think that R&D intensity is a good input measure considering the correlation between R&D intensity
and other R&D measures. The correlations are 0.756 and 0.759 with total and business R&D expenditures
for 89 regions. Both coefficients are significant at 1 percent level.
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2.3 Institutions, Literacy and Universities
To estimate causal links between social capital, innovation and economic growth we need
a set of instruments. To find instruments we use historical information from institutions,
following a recent trend in the literature (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002;
Tabellini, 2005).
2.3.1 Historical data on literacy
Education is an important determinant of economic growth (e.g., Barro, 2001). Sandberg
(1982) showed for 21 European countries that there exists a relationship between the
literacy rates in 1850 and per capita income in 1970, but not between literacy and income
in 1850, suggesting that literacy affects economic well-being in the very long-run. This
finding is further supported by Nunez (1990) for 49 Spanish provinces. Unfortunately, in
most of these studies it is unclear how literacy translates into better economic outcomes.
A not so emphasized aspect of education is that it facilitates an environment in which
“good” cultural character can form. For instance Cipolla (1969) argues that, literacy in
the 17th and 18th century served as a basic intellectual and cultural humus for the develop-
ment of both mechanical and organizational innovations in the industrial revolution.5 So,
regions lacking solid educational institutions several centuries ago are likely to have poorer
cultural character when compared to regions with well-established educational institutions
(Tabellini, 2005) and these “good” cultural traits may have an impact on current economic
growth. For instance, Lazear (1999) shows how common culture and language facilitates
trade between individuals. It is true that trade still exists in the case of multiculturalism
but only with intermediaries and in a world of second best where transactions are costly.
In the presence of more social capital these transaction costs are falling. The argument
here is that, besides a direct effect of education on economic growth, an indirect effect
that operates through social capital exists as well.
We use literacy rates in the 1870s and 1880s as a proxy for education. Although the
information differs slightly for different regions, in most cases the collected information
refers to the percentage of the population that can read and write − including the people
who can read only − in 1870s and 1880s. Except for Austria, Greece, France, Portugal and
Sweden we found data at the regional level. We collected the data from several different
5In his words “...widespread literacy meant not only an elastic supply of literate workers but also a
more rational and more receptive approach to life on the part of the population”(Cipolla, 1969, p. 102).
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sources, which is discussed in more detail in Appendix 2.1.
2.3.2 Historical Data on Universities
Universities are institutions that blend educational, social and cultural elements. Readings
(1996) argues that the evolution of culture can be understood in a framework of struggle
between the state and the university. Especially until the end of 19th century universities
had been the primary institution of national culture and identity and played central role
in national liberation movements. For instance, in the early 19th century after the battle
of Jena, it is not surprising that one of the first actions of Napoleon was to suppress Halle
University (Saxony-Anhalt, Germany) (e.g., Rudy, 1984).
Universities not only create graduates with a common world view educated in the same
cultural tradition but also indirectly shape the future of a region or a state by integrating
their graduates in the existing social structure. If universities are successful in transferring
this vision to the public, then this dynamic structure can serve to raise “good citizens”
who behave well and act collectively to reach a certain state of solidarity. In this respect,
universities provide quite an important public good that cannot be provided in other ways
(e.g., Cowan, 2005).
We employ two different variables on the history of European universities. First, univF
is defined as “2000 minus the foundation date of the university” to measure the period
of existence of universities in a particular region. The latter part refers to the date of
foundation of the first university established in a region. By construction, higher values
reflect the existence of universities in a region for longer periods. The second variable,
univN captures the density of universities. It is defined as the number of universities per
100,000 inhabitants around 1850. The main argument behind the hypothesized effects of
these variables is that universities establish a basis where regional culture or identity nur-
ture. This basis would eventually transform informal institutions and affect the formation
of social capital.
Along the same line of argument we develop two other historical measures. First,
the arithmetic average of the standardized values of univF and univN. Second, the first
principal component of the standardized values of the two variables. The major sources
for these variables are Ridder-Symoens (1996) and Jilek (1984). Further information can
be found in Appendix 2.4.
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2.3.3 Historical Data on Institutions
Tabellini (2005) argues that the current state of informal institutions is shaped by the
history of its formal institutions, such as political, legal and economic institutions. This
assertion becomes even stronger when considering that EU regions belonging to the same
country now were governed by different political power and institutions especially before
the 19th century. The argument here is that political liberalism has a positive impact in
nurturing “good” cultural character, whereas “bad” cultural character might be a reflection
of rigid autocratic political power in the past.
Several authors have argued that a political system inclined toward institutional liber-
alism, in which the supreme authority is constrained, is beneficial for economic well-being.
For instance, North and Weingast (1970) argue that England’s unique political institu-
tions play a major role in economic development at a later stage. In a study on European
cities, De Long and Shleifer (1993) show that absolutist monarchs discouraged growth of
commerce and industry in Western European cities in the period 1000-1880. In a similar
vein, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) argue that, during the period 1500-1850,
substantial economic gains occurred only in nations where the existing political institu-
tions were able to place significant checks and balances on political power. Most important
to our research is the effect of past political liberalism on the evolution of cultural traits.
In a seminal study that compares the Maghribi and Genoese traders in the late medieval
period Greif (1994) argues that divergent political and social histories and cultural her-
itages between the Maghribis and Genoeses gave rise to different cultural beliefs that later
affected the evolution of the societal organizations. He shows that collectivist cultural
beliefs, characterizing Maghribis, led to a societal organization in which the economic,
social and moral sanctions against aberrant behavior were applied (and controlled) by
certain group(s); whereas individualist cultural beliefs, characterizing Genoeses, resulted
in an organizational structure in which each group’s ability to use economic, social and
moral sanctions against individual members was limited. In this respect, for example,
“the medieval Latin individualist society may have cultivated the seeds of the ‘Rise of the
West’ ” (Greif, 1994, p. 943).
As a proxy for past political institutions, we employ data on “constraints on the execu-
tive” defined in the POLITY IV project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions,
1800-2002.6 It is coded on a scale 1 to 7, (1) representing “unlimited authority” and (7)
6For more information see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ and Eckstein and Gurr (1975).
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“accountable executive constrained by checks and balances”. More information on the
coding can be found in Appendix 2.3. This variable presumably captures “institutional-
ized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or
collectivities” and hence higher values are associated with a tendency towards democratic
institutions and political liberalism.
Most of the observations in our data come from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2002) and Tabellini (2005). In some cases we draw on the website of the POLITY IV
project. Over 70 regions in our data set are coded using the above sources. We coded the
variable “constraints on the executive” in the same way as POLITY IV for the remaining
regions (or countries). If the region had no (or little) political autonomy then all regions
are assigned the same value. In doing so, we consider the political institutions in a 40-
year window around each date (for instance for 1850, we consider the period 1830-1870).
Information is available for five dates: 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. In the second
half of the 19th century most countries in our sample completed their unification process,
so after 1850 we expect regional differences to be less important. Detailed information on
how the variables are coded is presented in Appendix 2.3.
Following Tabellini (2005) we define two variables. First, instAVR is the arithmetic
average of five variables, inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800 and inst1850. The vari-
ables instXXXX are defined as the political institutions in year XXXX. Second, we define
instPC, as the first principal component of the five variables.7
Appendix 1.1 provides the definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the core variables applied in this paper.
3 Empirical Strategy
To show that social capital improves economic outcomes, the literature has used two
strategies. The conventional method is estimating a growth equation using OLS, in which
per capita GDP growth is regressed on usual determinants of growth (such as the initial
per capita GDP, investment, education) and a set of social capital indicators (for instance
trust, membership to voluntary organizations etc.). However, the problem of reverse
causation is fundamental in estimating these relationships because current levels of social
7The eigenvalue for the first component is 3.72 and describes 75 percent of the total variation in the
five variables. The first eigenvector ranges between 0.39 and 0.49, suggesting roughly an equal weight for
each variable.
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capital are likely to be influenced by past and current economic conditions. Hence, OLS
correlates of the relationship between social capital and economic outcomes could be biased
and cannot be interpreted as reflecting causal effects of social capital on economic growth.
To estimate causal relationships Knack and Keefer (1997) use the number of law faculty
graduates as an instrument for social capital and Tabellini (2005) employs information on
history of political institution between the 17th to 19th century and literacy rates at the
end of 19th century as instruments for culture.
Our empirical implementation differs in three ways from the existing literature. First,
social capital is positively correlated with levels of education. Higher levels of education
would generally result in denser networks in which social capital forms and higher social
capital would also lead to better education opportunities. This dynamic relation has not
been incorporated in previous research analyzing the effect of social capital on growth.
In terms of the methodology, this suggests considering interaction terms between social
capital and education. We expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be positive.
Second, we know that economic performance is positively correlated with innovative
activities. It is also known that societies in which people enjoy each other’s confidence
experience a higher level of economic performance. This implies that societies with a
higher level of trust are better able to manage the process of innovation and that creative
effort will be rewarded in relatively trusting societies. To illustrate our assertion we plotted
trust against patent applications in 1991 and 2000 and the results suggest a strong relation
between the two indicators (see Figure 4 and 5). The correlation coefficients equal 0.433
and 0.453, respectively. We incorporate this relation to our framework by employing a
patent regression, in which we explain patent applications with R&D intensity, education
and trust.
Third, an important difficulty is to combine these causal relations (i.e., from trust
to growth; from trust to innovation; from innovation to growth) into one structure. In
addition to simultaneity problems, both the growth and innovation equation contain trust
which is endogenous to the system either as a result of omitted variables or measurement
error: Regions with higher levels of social capital may facilitate a structure in which it
is easier and more effective to implement policies to further foster economic development
and boost innovation (Akc¸omak and ter Weel, 2005). Nevertheless, it is hard to measure
policy success but assuming that such indicators are relevant, they are omitted from both
equations (1) and (2). So, it is reasonable to assume that trust may be correlated with
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the error term. This suggests an estimation method in which trust is instrumented.
A solution to this problem is to add a third equation to the system, i.e. a linear pro-
jection of the endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in the simultaneous system.
In addition to the exogenous variables, including instruments that are correlated with
trust would alleviate weak instrument problems. We instrument trust with the historical
information collected on literacy rates, universities and political institutions. Estimating
this system with 3SLS produces consistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 9).
The following system is estimated using this strategy:
growth = β0 + β1gdppc90 + β2pat91 + β3trust +
β4educ + β5urban+  (1)
pat91 = α0 + α1R&Dintns + α2trust + α3educ + υ (2)
trust = δ0 + δ1literacy + δ2instPC + δ3univPC +
δ4X + η, (3)
where the subscript r for regions has been suppressed for notational convenience, and the
error terms comply with the assumptions described above. Growth is the per capita GDP
growth in the period 1990-2002 and pat91 is the log of patent applications per million
inhabitants in 1991. We include the log of initial GDP per capita, gdppc90, as a measure
of convergence. R&Dintns represents our measure of R&D intensity. We employ the
trust measure from the ESS. Our education variable educ captures the current effect of
education on growth next to the effect through our historical data. Urban is a proxy for
the economic development around 1850s. The reason for including this covariate is that
Tabellini (2005) shows that the historical instruments influence current economic growth
through social capital rather than a long-run process of economic growth. In equation (3),
X denotes the vector of variables exogenous to the system consisting of gdppc90, R&Dintns,
educ, urban and the three instruments. The instruments are the following: literacy is the
literacy rate in 1880; univPC is the first principal component of two indicators measuring
the intensity and the period of existence of universities in the 19th century; and instPC
represents the first principal component of five indicators measuring the state of political
institutions between 1600 and 1850. All the equations include country fixed effects.
17
Figures 6-9 and Table 3 present the correlations between our measure of social capital
and the instruments. Literacy and trust are strong and positively correlated as well as
trust and institutions. The correlation between trust and the measure of the presence and
density of universities is positive but less strong.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Effect of Social Capital on Growth
Table 4 first presents estimates of the effect of social capital on growth for 102 regions by
estimating
growth = β0 + β1gdppc90 + β2educ+ β3urban+ β4trust+ , (4)
using OLS. The estimates suggest that higher levels of trust yield higher GDP growth in
the period 1990-2002. The estimate suggests that a one standard deviation (0.78) increase
in social capital increases regional growth by 14 percent. This result is consistent with
the estimates presented in Knack and Keefer (1997) for a cross-section of countries over
the period 1980-1992. In column (2) we added an interaction term to capture the possible
complementarity between social capital and education. The results do not change. Using
trust0 − the trust indicator from EVS90 − yields similar estimates.
Social capital is endogenous and column (3) in Table 4 reports the first stage of the
instrumental variables strategy. The first-stage estimates suggest that all instruments are
positively and significantly correlated with trust. This correlation is not surprising given
the individual correlations between the instruments and trust from Figures 6 to 9 and
Table 3 above. F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments always exceed the
critical value of 10, suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). Finally, the 2SLS estimates
reported in column (4) of Table 4 imply that there is a strong and significant impact of
social capital on economic growth in the period 1990-2002. Hausman, Sargan and F-tests
reported at the bottom of Table 4 suggest that these estimates are robust.
Table 5 reports first-stage and second-stage estimates using the instruments individu-
ally in three sets of regressions. The estimates suggest that the coefficient of social capital
is somewhat sensitive to the use of different instruments, but the effects remain quali-
tatively similar compared to the estimates in Table 4. We have estimated a number of
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alternative equations using instruments of groups of two or three and they always pro-
duced a trust coefficient significant at the five percent level. We never encountered a case
of weak instruments in the first stage because all instruments returned an F-test of joint
significance greater than 10. Also the null-hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions
are valid is never rejected.8
4.2 The Effect of Social Capital on Innovation
Table 6 first reports the results from estimating
pat91 = β0 + β1R&Dintns+ β2educ+ β3trust+ , (5)
and
pat00 = β0 + β1R&Dintns+ β2educ+ β3trust+ , (6)
using OLS. The estimates suggest that a region’s innovative output is higher when it level
of social capital is higher. These estimates are consistent with the ones presented by
Fritsch (2004). He finds that cooperation increases the efficiency of R&D activities, which
most likely yields higher numbers of successful innovations and patents.
To address the endogeneity of social capital we have used the same three indicators as
instruments as for the analysis reported in Table 4. Both the first-stage (columns (3)) and
second-stage estimates (columns (4) and (5)) are consistent with higher levels of social
capital yielding higher levels of innovative output in terms of patents both in 1991 and
2000.
Table 7 reports a number of alternative specifications in which we included the three
instruments separately. In addition, we again analyzed the behavior of the instruments
individually or as a group in 2SLS estimations, which resulted in estimating 17 2SLS
regressions. All regressions produced a trust coefficient significant at the 5% percent level.
The regressions do not suffer from weak instrument problems and the null-hypothesis that
the over-identifying restrictions are valid is never rejected. Only univPC fails to produce
a significant trust coefficient in the second stage for the patent regression (columns (8)
and (9)).
8We also conducted a detailed analysis in which we consider four university indicators, univPC, uni-
vAVR, univF and univN. This analysis consists of estimating 29 regressions. In this case we found that
only the indicator univF has a relatively poor performance as an instrument for trust with significance
only at the ten percent level.
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4.3 Stability
Despite its popularity the literature on empirical economic growth is criticized regarding
the robustness of the results achieved. Levine and Renelt (1992) assessed the robustness
of the conclusions of cross-country growth regressions and found that almost all results
are fragile. To assess the robustness of our findings we investigate how responsive the
estimates of trust are to inclusion of other relevant variables that might have an impact
on GDP growth or patent growth.
The methodology simply involves assessing the fragility of an independent variable to
a change in the information set. The analysis starts by estimating equations of the form
Y = Fαj + βijXi + γjSj + j (7)
where Y is a vector of GDP per capita growth rates or patent applications, F is a matrix of
independent variables that are always included in the regressions , X is our social capital
measure, Sj is a set of switch variables that are hypothesized to be in relation with the
dependent variable and j is the error term. The subscript i indexes trust and j indexes
the different combinations of switch variables. The analysis assesses the sensitivity of βij
when different sets of switch variables are added to the regression.9
We conducted robustness analysis for both per capita GDP growth and patent models
(equations (1) and (2), respectively). In the former model the dependent variable is
the growth of per capita GDP 1990-2002 and the fixed variables are log of initial GDP,
education, trust and urbanization rates in 1850 (Table 4, column 1). For the latter the
dependent variable is the patent applications to EPO 1991 and the fixed variables are
R&D intensity, education and trust (Table 6, column 1). The regressions also include a
constant term and country dummies.
Following Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004) we selected switch variables
from a pool of independent variables from the ESS and Eurostat databases that are ex-
ogenous to trust. In selecting these variables we considered two criteria:
i) The correlation between a switch variable and trust should be less than 0.50 in
absolute value; and
9In employing such a methodology we benefited from MetaGrowth, a computer program designed
specifically to assess robustness issues, developed by Heijungs, de Groot, and Florax (2001). For an
application of the program on the findings of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) see
Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004).
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ii) The correlation within switch variables should be less then 0.50 in absolute value.
We identified 29 switch variables, which are presented in a table in Appendix 2.1. These
switch variables are introduced to the primary regression in all combinations of 1 to 3
variables at a time. In the first column of Tables 8 and 9 we present how many times
a variable appeared in a regression for the growth and patent regressions, respectively.
For example, in assessing the robustness of trust, 4,090 regressions are estimated implying
that trust appeared in all of these regressions and the statistics provided are calculated
by taking all of these regressions into account. We assess the robustness of our results by
employing six different tests.
i) Strong sign test : All coefficients for trust have the same sign.
ii) Weak sign test : 90% of the coefficients for trust have the same sign.
iii) Strong extreme bounds test : This analysis was introduced by Leamer and Leonard
(1983).10 The relationship between the dependent variable and trust is robust if all esti-
mated coefficients for trust have the same sign and are statistically significant at the same
time.
iv) Weak extreme bounds test : Sala-i Martin (1997) relaxed the above criterion arguing
that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable is robust if
90% of the estimated coefficients for the independent variable have the same sign and are
significant at the same time.
v) Weighted extreme bounds test : This test refers to the weighted weak extreme bounds
test. The weights are defined as the value of the likelihood of the regression. It is robust
if 90% of the estimated coefficients for trust have the same sign and are significant at the
same time.
vi) Value of the cumulative density function: This test is based on the fraction that
lies at the right side of zero of the cumulative density function. A variable passes the test
(at a 10% significance level) if the test score is smaller than 0.10 or larger than 0.90.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Tables 8 and 9 and highlight a number
of points. First, the relationship between trust and per capita GDP growth is robust
to inclusion of other variables. Trust passes 4 of the 6 tests and about 80 percent of the
time the resulting coefficient is significant (Table 8). Furthermore, in the patent regressions
10See also Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) for an application to growth literature
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(Table 9), trust passes all of the tests and for all of the estimated regressions the estimated
coefficient is significant.
Second, for the growth regressions two indicators from ESS, help and opinion, display
robust results and both have a positive impact on growth. The former can be viewed as a
social capital indicator since it is derived from a question asking “How often do you help
others not counting work or voluntary work”. The latter can be viewed as an indicator of
culture. The respondents were asked to rate “To be a good citizen. How important is to
form independent opinion?” on a scale from 0 “extremely unimportant” to 10 “extremely
important”. Apart from these, shares of agricultural and industrial employment seem to
have robust impacts on growth. Finally, the indicators discussed above also display a
robust character in the patent regression. But additionally, we found strong evidence on
the robustness of the indicator skill. This can be viewed as a measure of openness and it
is constructed from a question asking “all countries benefit if people can move where their
skills are most needed”.11
Appendix 3 presents a more detailed discussion of the impact of the presence of certain
switch variables on the probability of obtaining a significant trust coefficient. We find that
most regressions in which the trust coefficient is insignificant includes other statistically
significant measures of social capital such as, help, polactiv and opinion.
4.4 Social Capital, Innovation and Growth
Incorporating trust and innovation in a growth regression is possible by estimating a simple
OLS regression in which growth is the dependent variable (see Table 10, column (1)). The
results suggest that innovation and social capital have a positive but insignificant correla-
tion with growth. However, trust and pat91 are highly correlated and considering both as
independent variable may result in misleading findings because of possible multicollinear-
ity problems. The final step in the estimation of the model is to estimate the full model by
using the 3SLS strategy. Table 10 reports the results from estimating this model. The core
message from these estimates is that more advanced past institutions, such as universities,
stable political environments and early literacy, yield higher levels of present social capital
(column (5)). This social capital is a strong determinant of innovation outcomes along
with traditional inputs such as education and R&D investments (column (4)). Finally,
11For the indicator help, the answer categories ranges from (1) “everyday” to (6) “less often than” and
for skill, the answer categories ranges from (1) “agree strongly” to (5) “disagree strongly”. We reversed
these scales so that higher values are expected to associate with better innovative and economic outcomes.
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innovation determines growth, but there is not a strong direct impact of social capital on
growth (columns (2) and (3)). The results of the full model are presented in column 92)
of Table 10 and the separate steps are reported in columns (3)-(5). The magnitude of the
direct effect of trust on growth is rather similar, however not significant. A one standard
deviation (0.77) change in trust is associated with a change in patent applications of 0.94
of a standard deviation, much higher than the impact of R&Dintns and educ. The effect
of social capital on growth seems to work through innovation. Together, our findings im-
ply that social capital is a significant determinant of innovation, which in turn explains
approximately 15 percent of economic growth in the EU regions between 1990 and 2002.
These results have important implications for the literature on relating a region’s (or
country) social capital to economic performance. Mostly these studies have been concerned
with the causal relationship between social capital and economic outcomes, neglecting
explicit definitions of why social capital should have a direct impact or indirect impact
through a third factor on economic growth. Our estimates suggest that innovation is an
important third factor explaining how social capital increases economic outcomes, largely
neglected by this literature.
5 Conclusion
In cross-country comparisons measures of social capital have a direct effect on economic
outcomes, such as growth and investments (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997). It is however
not clear how social capital improves outcomes. This paper identifies innovation as an
important channel by which social capital influences economic growth.
The main contribution of this paper is to show for 102 regions of the EU-14 that early
institutions shape current social capital, which in turn influences innovation in regional
comparisons. Innovation has an impact on economic growth, but the direct effect of social
capital on economic growth vanishes. These results are obtained using 3SLS estimates
in which it is assumed that past institutions and literacy rates are valid instruments for
social capital. We show that our methods and estimates are valid and robust.
An implication of this result is that historical differences between regions of an other-
wise relatively homogeneous set of countries seem to have a lasting effect on social capital.
The contribution of social capital to creating an environment in which capitalists and
entrepreneurs are able to strike the best deals improves innovation outcomes, which are
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different between regions, holding constant any unobserved national variable and contem-
poraneous education and urbanization rates. Of course, social capital and innovation are
not treated at the microeconomic level, so the exact transformation of social capital into
innovation remains unclear. But, the estimates suggest that research into this direction is
promising.
The idea that the effect of social capital on economic growth works through innovation
has policy implications for Europe. The findings suggest that backward regions cannot
improve fast in terms of innovation and economic growth, because the shaping of social
capital is crucial and takes long to develop. It also suggests that public investments
in R&D might not be beneficial because in all likelihood the private sector has trouble
investing money efficiently. These regions would benefit probably more from investments
in education, because human capital and social capital are likely to be complementary.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Appendix 1.1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable Definition
growth Growth of per capita GDP 1990-2002, defined as the log difference of
GDP per capita in the period 1990-2002. Source: Eurostat.
gdppc90 log GDP per capita in 1990. Source: Eurostat.
educ Education defined as the share of tertiary level students (levels 5, 6
and 7) in the total number of all students in 1993, according to the
International Standard Classification of Education 1976 (ISCED76)
definitions. ISCED 5 covers programs that generally do not lead
to a university degree but usually require successful completion of
a program at the upper secondary level. ISCED 6 covers programs
that lead to an award of a first university degree and ISCED 7 covers
programs that lead to an award of a second or further university
degree. Source: Eurostat.
pat91 Patent applications per million inhabitants centered around 1991 (av-
erage of 1990, 1991, 1992). The number of patent application is
measured as “total number of patent applications to the European
Patent Office(EPO) by year of filing, excluding patent applications
to the national patent offices in Europe”. Source: Eurostat.
pat00 Patent applications per million inhabitants centered around 2000 (av-
erage of 1999, 2000 and 2001). Source: Eurostat.
R&Dintns R&D intensity defined as R&D personnel employment as a percentage
of total employment in the business enterprise sector in 1995. Source:
Eurostat.
trust Generalized trust using the answer to the following question; “Most
people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful”. The answer
category ranges from (0) “you can’t be too careful” to (10) “most
people can be trusted”, with nine levels in between. The mean (std.
dev.) of this measure for EU-14 countries is 4.945 (2.395) N=25,268.
Source: European Social Surveys (ESS) first round in 2002.
trust*educ Interaction variable of trust and educ.
literacy Literacy rates around 1880. See Appendix 2.1 for details.
29
Variable Definition
trust0 Generalized trust from EVS 1990. The respondents are asked “gener-
ally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. The interviewees
were given two choices: (i) most people can be trusted or (ii) you
can’t be too careful. The mean value of this measure for 11 Euro-
pean countries is 0.369 (0.482), N=17,322. Source European Values
Survey (EVS) in 1990.
instXXXX Proxy for past political institutions as measured by “constraints on
the executive” as defined in the POLITY IV data set. This variable
captures “institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers
of chief executives” coded on a scale 1 to 7, 1 representing “unlimited
authority” and 7 “accountable executive constrained by checks and
balances”. Information is available separately for five dates: 1600,
1700, 1750, 1800, 1850. See Appendix 2.3 for details.
instAVR Average of inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800 and inst1850. See
Appendix 2.3 for details.
instPC First principal component of inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800
and inst1850. See Appendix 2.3 for details.
univF Measures the period of existence of a university in a region defined as
“univF = 2000 minus the foundation date of the university”. Higher
values reflect the existence of universities in a region for longer peri-
ods. See Appendix 2.4 for details.
univN The density of universities defined as the number of universities per
100,000 population around 1850. See Appendix 2.4 for details.
univAVR Average of the standardized values of univF and univN. See Appendix
2.4 for details.
univPC First principal component of standardized values of univF and univN.
See Appendix 2.4 for details.
urban Urbanization rates defined as the share of population living in towns
greater than 30,000 in total population in 1850. See Appendix 2.2
for details.
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Appendix 1.2 Variables Employed in the Stability Analysis
Variable Definition
polactiv Could take an active role in a group involved in political issues.
trustlgl Trust in legal system.
trustep Trust in European Parliament
ginveco The less government intervenes in economy the better it is.
lawobey The law should always be obeyed.
ecohenv Economic advances harm the environment.
immig Immigration good or bad for country’s economy.
skill All countries benefit if people can move where thier skills are needed.
minority People of minority/ethnic group in ideal living area.
shrtrad Better for a county if almost everyone share the same customs and
traditions.
shrreli Better for a country if almost everyone share the same religion.
help How often help others not counting voluntary work.
impsupport To be a good citizen: How important to support people worse off.
implaw To be a good citizen: How important to always obey in laws.
opinion To be good citizen: How important to form independent opinion.
social Take part in social activities compared to others in the same age.
cath Percentage of Catholic.
prot Percentage of Protestant.
orth Percentage of Orthodox.
othc Percentage of Other Christian.
jewi Percentage of Jewish.
isla Percentage of Islam.
east Percentage of Eastern religions.
olson Active member of Olson groups.
putnam Active member of Putnam groups.
domgr Dominant religious group, share in total population.
lrscale Political opinion: Left-right scale.
shragremp Share of agricultural employment in total employment 1990. Source:
Eurostat.
shrindemp Share of industrial employment in total employment 1990. Source:
Eurostat.
Data source for all the variables, except shragremp and shrindemp, is ESS.
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Appendix 2: Further Details on Historical Data
A2.1 Historical Data on Literacy Rates
Data on literacy come from different sources. Below we present in detail the variable
definition and the data source for each country. For most of the cases the information
available is the percentage of the population that can read and write − including the
people who can read only − in 1870s and 1880s.
Country Variable definition and data source
Austria The literacy rate is defined as the percentage of the population that
is able to read and write including people who can read only in 1880.
The data for West-Osterreich is the average of Salzburg, Tyrol and
Voralberg. Data source: Flora (1983).
Belgium Percentage of the population that is able to read and write in 1880.
The percentage of the population who can read only is higher than
the percentage of people who can read and write by about 15 percent.
We therefore inflated each regional figure by 15 percent. Data source:
Flora (1983).
Denmark Percentage of the population that is not literate (100 − illiteracy).
Information available only for males in 1860. Data source: Cipolla
(1969).
Finland Percentage of the population, 10 years or older, that is able to read
and write and read only in 1880. Data source: Flora (1983).
France We have used the average of three source of information available:
(i) percentage of the population able to read (69.2%) in 1871/72,
(ii) army recruits able to read (83%), (iii) percentage of bridegrooms
and brides able to write their names (84% and 74%), respectively.
No regional information available around 1880s. Data source: Flora
(1983).
Greece Approximate figure: Greece was occupied by the Ottoman empire
till the 1830s and then ruled by the Bavarian Prince Otto (later
changed name to Othon). In several sources it is mentioned that,
in the rural areas of Greece the education level was very low in the
second half of the 19th century. Given that urbanization rates were
well below the average and the similarity of the Greek regions with
other Mediterranean regions, (such as Southern Italy 20.4%, South-
ern Spain around 20%, Serbo-Croation estimated as 22-29% in 1870s
and 80s) we suppose the literacy rate in Greece was about 20 percent
in 1880s. No regional information available. Data source: Cipolla
(1969) and Flora (1983).
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Country Variable definition and data source
Germany Literacy defined as (100 − illiteracy in population aged 10 years
or older) in 1871. For Baden-Wuttemberg, Bayern, and Thurin-
gen we took the average of the neighboring regions Hessen-Nassau,
Westfalia, Saxony. The figure for Bremen and Hamburg is the
average of Hannover and Schleswig-Holstein. Since there is not
an exact correspondence to Saarland in the source data, we re-
place it with the available information on Rheinland-Pfalz. The
correspondence of the remaining current regions and regions in
Cipolla (1969) is as follows : Berlin (Berlin), Brandenburg (Branden-
burg), Hessen (Hessen-Nasau), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Pomera-
nia), Niedersachsen (Hannover), Nordrhein-Westfalen (Westfalia),
Rheinland-Pfalz (Rheinland), Sachsen (Saxony), Sachsen-Anhalt
(Saxony) and Schleswig-Holstein (Schleswig-Holstein). Data source:
Cipolla (1969).
Ireland The data represent the average of percentage of people, +5 and +10
years old, respectively who are able to read in 1880. Data source:
Flora (1983).
Italy Literacy defined as (100 − illiteracy in population aged 5 years or
older) in 1881. For cases in which there are no explicit regional
matches between the current Italian regions and the source(s), we
employed the following correspondence: Valle D’Aosta (Piemonte),
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (Veneto). For Umbria there are important dif-
ferences between two data sources, so we have used the average (in
Cipolla (1969) 26%; in Flora (1983) 33%). Data source: Cipolla
(1969) and Flora (1983).
The Nether-
lands
Percentage of army recruits able to read in 1880. No regional data
are available. Data source: Flora (1983).
Portugal Literacy rate as defined by Tortella (1994). No regional information
is available.
Spain Literacy rates for the population aged 10 and older. Data source:
Nunez (1990).
Sweden Percentage of army recruits able to read and write and percentage of
recruits able to read in 1880. Data source: Flora (1983).
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Country Variable definition and data source
UK Literacy figures are derived from the percentages of brides and grooms
signing the marriage registers with marks in 1870. The numbers
were aggregated using the population statistics in Mitchell (1988).
The correspondence of current UK NUTS1 definitions and regions
in Stephens (1973) are as follows: North East (Durham, Northum-
berland); North West (Cheshire, Cumberland, Lancashire, Westmor-
land); Yorkshire-Humber (Yorkshire); East Midlands (Derbyshire,
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire,
Rutland); West Midlands (Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire,
Warwickshire, Worcestershire); East of England (Bedforshire, Cam-
brisdgehire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, Suf-
flok); Greater London (London, Middlesex); South East (Berkshire,
Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, Sussex);
South West (Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somer-
set, Wiltshire); Wales (South Wales, North Wales, Monmoutshire).
Data for Scotland are for 1871 and from Cipolla (1969). Data for
Northern Ireland are from Flora (1983) and represent the percentage
of people able to read in 1880. Data source: Cipolla (1969), Stephens
(1973) and Flora (1983).
A2.2 Historical data on Urbanization and Population
The population of each region is calculated from the available data at
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/populhome.html.
The original data sources can be found at
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/sources.html.
In general, the regional population data belong to years ranging from 1849 to 1861. Specifi-
cally: Belgium (1849); Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Portugal (1850); Nether-
lands and Spain (1849/50); Greece and Sweden (1850/51); France and UK (1851); Italy
(1861). For Greece we manage to find regional information only for region Attiki. The
scores for other three regions are simply the country average.
The urbanization rate is defined as the percentage of population living in towns with more
than 30,000 residents about 1850. The city population data are mainly from Bairoch, Ba-
tou, and Che`vre (1988). We also calculated urbanization rate considering cities with more
than 20,000 residents. The difference between the two variables is less then 5% for most
of the regions, excluding Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE8), Cantabria (ES13), Navarra
(ES22), Valenciana (ES52), Illes Balears (ES53), Andalucia (ES61), Murcia (ES62), Nord-
Pas-De-Calais (FR3), Puglia (ITF4), Sicilia (ITG1), Sardegna (ITG2), Oost Nederland
(NL2), Zuid-Nederland (NL4) and North East (UKC).
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A2.3 Historical Data on Institutions
To capture the impact of past political institutions on current social capital we employed
the data on “constraints on the executive” as a proxy as defined in the POLITY IV project,
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. This variable captures “in-
stitutionalised constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities”. It is coded on a scale 1 to 7, (1) representing “unlimited au-
thority” and (7) “accountable executive constrained by checks and balances”, categories
(2), (4) and (6) referring to intermediate situations. Below we summarize each category
according to the POLITY IV Project, Dataset Users Manual (pages 23-24) accessible also
via the POLITY IV web page available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
(1) Unlimited authority : Refers to cases in which there are no regular limitations on the
executive’s actions. For instance, situations in which constitutional restrictions on execu-
tive action are ignored; constitution is frequently revised/suspended; there is no legislative
assembly or even if there is one it is dismissed at the executive’s initiative.
(3) Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority : Existence of some real but limited
constraints on the executive. Example evidences: Legislature can initiate some categories
of legislation independently of the executive and is able to block implementation of exec-
utive acts and decrees or cases in which independent judiciary is present.
(5) Substantial limitations on executive authority : The accountability group has substan-
tial constraints on the executive. For instance cases in which a legislature or a party
council can modify or defeat executive’s proposals or in which the accountability group
makes important appointments to administrative posts.
(7) Executive parity or subordination: In most areas of activity the legislature or the
parliament has effective authority equal to or greater than the executive. Examples of
evidence: The accountability group initiates most important legislation; the executive is
dependent on the legislature’s continued support to remain in office.
We manage to compile information for most of the data points in our data set following
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and in particular Tabellini (2005). In case of
missing observations for some regions and countries the POLITY IV data set available
from the web page of the POLITY IV project has been consulted. Above data sources
enabled us to gather information on more than 70 EU regions in our data set. For regions
for which no data are available, we coded the variable “constraints on the executive” in
the same way as the POLITY IV dataset considering the political institutions in a 40-year
window around each date. Information is available for five dates: 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800
and 1850. Below we present detailed information on how we coded some regions as well
as the data sources for each country.
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Country Brief historical information and data source
Austria At the end of 17th century most of the current Austrian lands
were under the control of Habsburgs, accept the ecclesiastical states
Salzburg and Voralberg. This situation did not change till the be-
ginning of 18th century; the Habsburgs gain more power and control
over the territories. After the Habsburgs, the area was dominated
by the Austrain Empire. The states did not have individual power
and the political environment in this period can be identified as an
absolutist monarchy. Polity IV data set codes Austria as (3) only
after 1860 and before that it is coded as (1). Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2002) code 1850 as (2) and all remaining years as (1).
Since we are interested in a 40-year window around 1850, we coded
1850 as (2) suggesting a transitory period.
Belgium Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Denmark Data source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002)
Finland Finland was an integral part of Sweden till 1803 and then mainly
dominated by Russia. As the executives of both countries were mainly
absolutist, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) codes Finland
as (1) for all periods. We also coded Finland as (1) for all of the 5
data points.
France Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Greece Greece was under the domination of the Ottoman Empire during most
of the period and only after 1830s emerged as a separate country (by
the Convention of May 11, 1832), but still under the dominance of
the Bavarian prince Otto of Wittelsbach. The administration and
the army of the country was mainly ruled by the Bavarian officials,
until 1843 when a revolt broke out in Athens due to accumulated
Greek discontent. King Othon (Otto adopted the name Othon) had
to convene the National Assembly and granted a constitution in 1843.
The POLITY IV data set codes Greece as (3) after this date. However
the Greek territory in the 1840s and 1850s does not match with the
current Greek territory. According to the historical maps, Voreia
Ellada and Nisia were still under the control of the Ottoman Empire
for about another 30-40 years. Considering this we coded Voreia
Ellada and Nisia as (1) for all years. Kentriki Ellada and Attiki are
coded as (3) in 1850 and as (1) for the remaining years.
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Country Brief historical information and data source
Germany For Baden-Wurttemberg, Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen,
Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland and
Schleswig-Holstein we use Tabellini (2005). Berlin and Brandenburg:
Berlin was under the dominance of Brandenburg (and later Prus-
sia) in most of the period that we are interested in. The period
1648-1790 is described as the period of absolutism for Branden-
burg and Prussia (Holborn, 1982). Therefore, 1600, 1700, 1750 and
1800 are coded as (1). The POLITY IV data set codes Prussia
as (1) between 1800-1839; (2) between 1840-58; and (3) between
1859-1889. Therefore, we coded 1850 as (2) suggesting a transi-
tory state. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Even after the separation
in 1815, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern was mostly affected by abso-
lutism. Therefore, in line with the other German states we code
1850 as (2) and all four dates before 1850 as (1). Sachsen: Under
domination of Saxony. POLITY IV codes Saxony as (1) between
1806-30 and (3) between 1831-1871, except a period of 8 years be-
tween 1840-47. All dates were coded as (1) before 1850 and 1850
is coded as (3). Sachsen-Anhalt: Sachsen-Anhalt was part of Sax-
ony. POLITY IV codes Saxony as (1) between 1806-30 and (3) be-
tween 1831-1871, except a period of 8 years between 1840-47. How-
ever northern part of Saxony, which is roughly the current Sachsen-
Anhalt region, was lost to Prussia with the Congress of Viennna in
1814-1815. Since POLITY IV codes Prussia as (2) between 1840-
1858, we therefore coded Sachsen-Anhalt as (2) in 1850. All other
dates are coded as (1). Thuringen: Coded as (1) for 1600-1800 and
(2) in 1850 in line with the other German states. For Germany we
benefited from Tabellini (2005), POLITY IV dataset and Holborn
(1982), as well as various historical maps in Holborn (1982) and at
http://www.zum.de/whkmla/index.html.
Ireland Both regions, Border-Midland-Western and Southern and Eastern
are coded the same. Data source Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2002).
Italy Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Netherlands Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Portugal Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Spain Data source: Tabellini (2005)
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Country Brief historical information and data source
Sweden Regions of Sweden did not have political autonomy. For this reason,
the regional scores represent the country score. The POLITY IV data
set codes Sweden as (3) between 1812-1854 and (4) between 1855-
1869. We coded Sweden as (3) for 1850 and as (1) for all the other
periods. Data source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002).
UK Data source: Tabellini (2005)
A2.4 Historical Data on Universities
We employed two different variables to capture the possible impact of universities (as
historical institutions blending educational, cultural and social aspects) on current social
capital. First, to measure the period of existence of universities in a particular region we
formed the univF variable defined as “univF = 2000 − the foundation date of the univer-
sity”, the latter part referring to the date of foundation of the first university established
in a region. In forming this variable we carefully examined the foundation dates (and re-
foundation dates if applicable) of all the universities in a region to make sure that for the
whole period at least one university was operational. Higher values reflect the existence
of universities in a region for longer periods.
The second variable, univN measures the density of the universities in a particular region
defined as the number of universities per 100,000 inhabitants around 1850. We started
from the 13th century and matched each university to a corresponding region. The origi-
nal data sources present information on the city and we matched cities to corresponding
regions. Details on the population data can be found in Appendix 2.2. We had to pay spe-
cial attention on three points to avoid double counting: (i) whether the university ceases
to exist at a later time, (ii) whether the university was re-founded at a later date under
the same name (or under a different name), (iii) whether the university is merged with
another university. We formed two other variables, one is simply the arithmetic average of
the standardized values of univF and univN and the other is the first principal component
of the standardized values of the two variables. The major sources for these variables are
Ridder-Symoens (1996), and Jilek (1984).
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Table A2.4.1 Historical Data on Universities
NUTS Region univF univN univAVR univPC
AT1 Ost-Osterreich 635 0.06 0.55 0.39
AT2 Sud-Osterreich 415 0.11 0.06 0.04
AT3 West-Osterreich 380 0.25 0.21 0.15
BE1 Brussels 166 0.30 -0.27 -0.19
BE2 Vlaams Gewest 575 0.09 0.44 0.31
BE3 Region Wallone 185 0.06 -0.63 -0.44
DE1 Baden Wurttemberg 615 0.13 0.62 0.44
DE2 Bayern 598 0.13 0.57 0.40
DE3 Berlin 190 0.24 -0.31 -0.22
DE4 Brandenburg 502 0.05 0.19 0.13
DE5 Bremen 30 0.00 -1.14 -0.80
DE6 Hamburg 81 0.00 -1.00 -0.71
DE7 Hessen 473 0.14 0.26 0.19
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 581 0.32 0.85 0.60
DE9 Niedersachsen 425 0.09 0.05 0.04
DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen 612 0.20 0.73 0.52
DEB Rheinland-Pfalz 546 0.05 0.30 0.21
DEC Saarland 52 0.00 -1.08 -0.76
DED Sachsen 591 0.12 0.54 0.38
DEE Sachsen-Anhalt 498 0.05 0.17 0.12
DEF Schleswig-Holstein 348 0.11 -0.12 -0.08
DEG Thuringen 621 0.21 0.77 0.54
DK0 Denmark 525 0.07 0.28 0.20
ES11 Galicia 474 0.06 0.13 0.09
ES12 Asturias 426 0.20 0.24 0.17
ES13 Cantabria 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
ES21 Pais Vasco 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
ES22 Navarra 460 1.43 2.42 1.71
ES23 La Rioja 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
ES24 Aragon 646 0.24 0.89 0.63
ES3 Madrid 413 0.49 0.70 0.49
ES41 Castilla Y Leon 782 0.28 1.31 0.93
ES42 Castilla La Mancha 511 0.31 0.65 0.46
ES43 Extramadura 27 0.00 -1.15 -0.81
ES51 Cataluna 700 0.08 0.76 0.53
ES52 Valenciana 501 0.36 0.71 0.50
ES53 Illes Balears 517 0.40 0.82 0.58
ES61 Andalucia 495 0.18 0.39 0.27
ES62 Murcia 217 0.25 -0.22 -0.16
FI1 Manner Suomi 360 0.06 -0.17 -0.12
FR1 Iˆle De France 800 0.04 0.95 0.67
FR2 Bassin Parisien 694 0.07 0.72 0.51
FR3 Nord-Pas-De-Calais 441 0.11 0.13 0.09
FR4 Est 578 0.13 0.52 0.37
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NUTS Region univF univN univAVR univPC
FR5 Ouest 663 0.10 0.69 0.49
FR6 Sud-Ouest 771 0.07 0.92 0.65
FR7 Centre-Est 661 0.09 0.67 0.47
FR8 Mediterranee 711 0.30 1.16 0.82
GR1 Voreia Ellada 52 0.00 -1.08 -0.76
GR2 Kentriki Ellada 36 0.00 -1.12 -0.79
GR3 Attiki 163 1.08 1.05 0.74
GR4 Nisia 27 0.00 -1.15 -0.81
IE01 Border-Midland-Western 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
IE02 Southern-Eastern 408 0.03 -0.10 -0.07
ITC1 Piemonte 596 0.06 0.45 0.32
ITC2 Valle D Aosta 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
ITC3 Liguria 529 0.25 0.60 0.42
ITC4 Lombardia 639 0.09 0.61 0.43
ITD3 Veneto 778 0.09 0.98 0.69
ITD4 Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 62 0.00 -1.05 -0.74
ITD5 Emilia Romagna 800 0.19 1.20 0.85
ITE1 Toscana 754 0.22 1.13 0.80
ITE2 Umbria 692 0.19 0.92 0.65
ITE3 Marche 460 0.56 0.94 0.67
ITE4 Lazio 697 0.39 1.27 0.90
ITF1 Abruzzo 139 0.08 -0.72 -0.51
ITF2 Molise 18 0.00 -1.17 -0.83
ITF3 Campania 776 0.08 0.95 0.67
ITF4 Puglia 252 0.08 -0.42 -0.30
ITF5 Basilicata 19 0.00 -1.17 -0.82
ITF6 Calabria 32 0.00 -1.13 -0.80
ITG1 Sicilia 556 0.17 0.53 0.38
ITG2 Sardegna 394 0.34 0.39 0.28
NL1 Noord-Nederland 415 0.39 0.53 0.38
NL2 Oost Nederland 400 0.34 0.41 0.29
NL3 West-Nederland 425 0.22 0.27 0.19
NL4 Zuid-Nederland 82 0.00 -1.00 -0.71
PT11 Norte 89 0.00 -0.98 -0.69
PT15 Algarve 21 0.00 -1.16 -0.82
PT16 Centro 710 0.08 0.78 0.55
PT17 Lisboa 710 0.13 0.87 0.61
PT18 Alentejo 442 0.33 0.50 0.36
SE01 Stockholm 123 0.48 -0.08 -0.06
SE02 Ostra Mellansverige 523 0.15 0.41 0.29
SE03 Sydsverige 334 0.18 -0.03 -0.02
SE04 Norra Mellansverige 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
SE05 Mellersta A Norrland 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
SE06 Ovre Norrland 35 0.00 -1.12 -0.79
SE07 Smaland Med Oarna 0 0.00 -1.22 -0.86
SE08 Vastsverige 46 0.00 -1.10 -0.77
UKC North East 343 0.29 0.18 0.12
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NUTS Region univF univN univAVR univPC
UKD North West 120 0.03 -0.85 -0.60
UKE Yorkshire-Humber 96 0.00 -0.96 -0.68
UKF East Midlands 119 0.10 -0.73 -0.52
UKG West Midlands 120 0.09 -0.75 -0.53
UKH East Of England 790 0.05 0.94 0.66
UKI Greater London 174 0.05 -0.67 -0.48
UKJ South East 800 0.04 0.95 0.67
UKK Sout West 91 0.00 -0.98 -0.69
UKL Wales 107 0.09 -0.78 -0.55
UKM Scotland 589 0.10 0.50 0.35
UKN Northern Ireland 418 0.14 0.12 0.08
univF is defined as “univF = 2000 − the foundation date of the university”.
univN is defined as “the number of universities per 100,000 population around 1850s”.
univPC is the “first principal component of univN and univF”.
univAVR is the “average of the standardized values of univN and univF”.
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Appendix 3: Further Analysis on the Stability
In this appendix we discuss in more detail the robustness analysis conducted in Sec-
tion 4.3. We investigate whether the significance level of trust in the growth regressions
is affected by the presence of particular switch variables. We conducted a meta-analysis
on the 4,090 regressions estimated in the robustness analysis in which every coefficient
constitutes one observation.
Meta-analysis is a quantitative literature review aiming at harmonizing and evaluat-
ing empirical results of an existing literature (e.g., Stanley, 2001; Florax, de Groot, and
de Mooij, 2002). In meta-analysis the dependent variable is usually an estimated coefficient
reported in earlier studies and the independent variables are moderator variables measur-
ing different features in the original studies (for instance, existence of certain variables,
research design, sample etc.). Despite its disadvantages and limitations meta-analysis has
been widely used in economics in recent years. The analysis presented here is not affected
by these usual limitations because all observations are from this paper only. This means
that the research design, variable definitions and sample are exactly the same for all obser-
vations in the meta-analysis. We are only interested whether the presence of certain switch
variables have an impact on the likelihood of obtaining a significant trust coefficient.
We defined a dummy variable for trust taking a value of 1 whenever trust is significant
in a regression and taking a value of 0 otherwise. For all the other switch variables we
defined dummy variables in the same manner. The analysis then constitutes of estimating
a probit model, regressing the trust dummy on all other dummy variables created for each
switch variable. This type of analyzes is common in other meta-analyzes (e.g., Waldorf
and Pillsung, 2005; van der Sluis, van Praag, and Vijverberg, 2005; Koetse, de Groot, and
Florax, 2006).We put special emphasis on the switch variables that returned a high fraction
of significant estimates as it is not worthwhile to assess the effect of switch variables that
are significant in only few regressions.
The results of the probit analysis is presented below in Table A3.12 The variables
are defined in Appendix 1.2. The results suggest the following. First, few variables were
dropped from the analysis automatically as the presence of these variables predicts a
failure (i.e. a non-significant trust coefficient) perfectly (not shown in the table below).
Among them the most important is help. All 250 regressions in which help is significant,
trust is insignificant. This suggests that the presence of help reduces the likelihood of
obtaining a significant trust coefficient. On the other hand, results of the probit analysis
show that including two other cultural factors, polactiv and opinion increases the chance
of obtaining a significant trust coefficient. What is more interesting is that the simple
correlation between these three variables and trust is lower than 0.20 but the correlation
among them is higher than 0.50. Moreover all three variables in all estimations (in growth
regressions) return a positive coefficient.13 This suggests that these variables might be
12To save space, we present only the results for the variables that returned significant coefficients. The
detailed results are available upon request.
13In almost all regressions opinion has a significant positive impact on growth. When only these regres-
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capturing another element of social capital other than trust. However given the complex
nature of social capital it is not straightforward to test this claim, and we leave this for
future research.
Second, the presence of variables on religion reduces the probability of obtaining a
significant trust coefficient although most of these variables do not survive in the stability
analysis. Similarly, there are only a few cases in which immig and skill return significant
coefficients in the main regressions, however the former seems to augment and the latter
seems to reduce the probability of obtaining a significant trust coefficient. Finally, the
share of agricultural employment affects the significance level of trust positively whereas
the share of industrial employment decreases it.
In sum, the detailed analysis reveals that certain switch variables have an impact on
the significance level of the coefficient of trust. There are 530 (13% of all estimated re-
gressions in the stability analysis) cases in which trust is not significant but social capital
might be captured by the presence of opinion, help and polactiv. This supports our find-
ings in the sense that at least one proxy for social capital has a positive and significant
impact on growth in about 95% of all 4,090 regressions estimated in the stability analysis.
Table A3: Results of the probit analysis on the stability regressions
coefficient marginal effect
polactiv 2.159 (0.180)*** 0.716 (0.035)***
immig 2.563 (0.336)*** 0.772 (0.036)***
skill -1.522 (0.257)*** -0.181 (0.010)***
opinion 1.187 (0.075)*** 0.410 (0.028)***
cath -0.789 (0.148)*** -0.147 (0.017)***
orth -1.184 (0.347)*** -0.166 (0.018)***
jewi -1.002 (0.278)*** -0.159 (0.020)***
isla -1.783 (0.227)*** -0.219 (0.009)***
east -0.915 (0.335)*** -0.150 (0.027)***
shragremp 0.823 (0.077)*** 0.273 (0.029)***
shrindemp -0.627 (0.197)*** -0.124 (0.026)***
constant -0.897 (0.032)***
Psuedo R square 0.205 0.205
LR χ2(15) / Wald χ2(15) 844.4 605.3
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
sions are considered, the coefficient of trust is significant in 223 cases and insignificant in 183 cases.
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Table 1: Trust, innovation and education by countries
trust trust0 pat91 pat00 R&Dintns educ
Austria 5.10 91.90 149.39 0.35 14.40
Belgium 4.68 0.30 62.69 148.98 0.48 15.47
Denmark 7.05 0.58 89.99 187.89 0.50 14.51
Finland 6.46 108.21 320.02 0.61 19.11
France 4.45 0.23 82.89 123.08 0.34 13.91
Germany 4.57 0.38 104.11 207.41 0.38 12.17
Greece 3.69 2.93 6.01 0.07 14.86
Ireland 5.47 0.48 18.48 74.10 0.29 11.53
Italy 4.57 0.32 30.01 58.37 0.12 14.55
Netherlands 5.69 0.53 105.75 225.12 0.35 14.03
Portugal 4.46 0.23 1.76 4.16 0.03 11.69
Spain 4.94 0.38 7.27 20.86 0.10 12.40
Sweden 6.06 0.67 125.92 282.57 0.47 11.91
UK 5.06 0.43 65.04 111.59 0.28 11.44
Total 4.88 0.39 58.29 116.10 0.25 13.08
Note: Each entry is the average of the regional figures of a particular country. The mean score of trust0 for
Germany is calculated as the average of 10 regions that belong to former West Germany.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
growth 0.50 0.21 0.08 1.18
gdppc90 13872.62 5412.90 4389.00 30263.90
educ 13.08 4.77 1.88 24.95
pat91 58.29 61.64 0.60 281.17
pat00 116.10 124.42 1.82 570.44
R&Dintns 1.16 0.68 0.06 3.53
trust 4.88 0.78 1.66 7.05
trust0 0.39 0.13 0.05 0.77
literacy 62.98 29.90 14.60 99.00
instAVR 2.49 1.48 1.00 5.60
instPC 0.03 1.98 -1.90 4.10
univF 377.38 264.70 0.00 800.00
univN 0.15 0.20 0.00 1.43
univAVR 0.02 0.60 -0.86 1.71
univPC 0.03 0.84 -1.22 2.42
urban 12.71 20.35 0.00 100.00
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Table 3: Correlation between the instruments and trust
trust instPC instAVR univPC univAVR literacy
trust 1
instPC 0.3744 1
instAVR 0.3604 0.9964 1
univPC 0.0151 -0.1662 -0.1596 1
univAVR 0.0151 -0.1662 -0.1596 1 1
literacy 0.4334 0.3091 0.3129 -0.0526 -0.0526 1
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Table 4: Social capital and economic growth
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
growth growth trust growth
gdppc90 -0.189 -0.184 0.326 -0.241
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.144)** (0.033)***
[0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.110]** [0.046]***
educ 0.017 0.019 -0.101 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.109) (0.020)
[0.008]** [0.009]* [0.077] [0.011]
urban 0.024 0.024 -0.119 0.040
(0.012)** (0.012)** (0.079) (0.017)**
[0.012]* [0.012]* [0.070] [0.013]***
trust 0.031 0.036 0.159
(0.015)** (0.015)** (0.047)***
[0.011]** [0.013]** [0.079]*
trust*educ 0.017
(0.013)
[0.007]**
instPC 0.455
(0.184)**
[0.174]**
literacy 0.392
(0.226)*
[0.135]**
univPC 0.222
(0.092)**
[0.083]**
constant 0.357 0.506 0.066 0.308
(0.101)*** (0.063)*** (0.473) (0.174)*
[0.056]*** [0.066]*** [0.207] [0.179]*
Hausman 20.43
(0.000)***
F-test 148.04
(0.000)***
Sargan-test 0.69
(0.700)
N 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.68
Adj R sqr 0.79 0.80 0.61 0.62
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All the regressions include country dummies.
Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous.
F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
Sargan is a test of over identification. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.
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Table 5: Alternative specifications for economic growth
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
trust growth trust growth trust growth
instPC 0.532
(0.184)***
[0.226]**
univPC 0.232
(0.097)**
[0.065]***
literacy 0.604
(0.227)***
[0.279]**
trust 0.160 0.123 0.199
(0.069)** (0.072)* (0.085)**
[0.133] [0.081] [0.091]**
gdppc90 0.289 -0.241 0.491 -0.226 0.312 -0.257
(0.144)** (0.039)*** (0.144)*** (0.038)*** (0.143)** (0.047)***
[0.165] [0.067]*** [0.246]* [0.051]*** [0.150]* [0.030]***
educ 0.019 0.016 -0.109 0.016 0.005 0.015
(0.102) (0.020) (0.115) (0.018) (0.103) (0.023)
[0.052] [0.011] [0.049]** [0.010] [0.066] [0.012]
urban -0.158 0.04 -0.09 0.036 -0.127 0.045
(0.081)* (0.018)** (0.083) (0.017)** (0.081) (0.021)**
[0.067]** [0.012]*** [0.094] [0.017]* [0.075] [0.020]**
constant 0.150 0.304 2.301 0.567 -0.230 0.211
(0.554) (0.212) (0.682)*** (0.098)*** (0.487) (0.255)
[0.259] [0.310] [0.240]*** [0.066]*** [0.377] [0.229]
Hausman 7.83 2.58 11.72
(0.006)*** (0.110) (0.000)***
F-test 5.53 12.91 4.69
(0.035)** (0.003)*** (0.049)**
N 102 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.75 0.64 0.58
Adj R sqr 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.70 0.57 0.49
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All the regressions include country dummies.
Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous.
F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
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Table 6: Social capital and innovation
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS
pat91 pat00 trust pat91 pat00
R&Dintns 0.292 0.292 0.035 0.239 0.243
(0.061)*** (0.053)*** (0.099) (0.078)*** (0.069)***
[0.094]*** [0.061]*** [0.047] [0.099]** [0.060]***
educ 0.219 0.188 -0.028 0.182 0.154
(0.050)*** (0.044)*** (0.084) (0.063)*** (0.056)***
[0.052]*** [0.049]*** [0.096] [0.045]*** [0.050]***
trust 0.226 0.164 0.637 0.545
(0.062)*** (0.054)*** (0.174)*** (0.155)***
[0.054]*** [0.055]** [0.076]*** [0.070]***
instPC 0.494
(0.186)***
[0.191]**
univPC 0.194
(0.090)**
[0.093]*
literacy 0.478
(0.231)**
[0.187]**
constant -0.303 0.164 -0.287 -0.238 -0.718
(0.435) (0.378) (0.461) (0.369) (0.328)**
[0.198] [0.145] [0.264] [0.105]** [0.089]***
Hausman 11.72 13.57
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
F-test 91.21
(0.000)***
Sargan 1.86 1.20
(0.393) (0.548)
N 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.66 0.78 0.82
Adj R sqr 0.83 0.86 0.58 0.74 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All the regressions include country dummies.
Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous.
F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
Sargan is a test of over identification. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.
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Table 7: Alternative specifications for innovation
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) 2SLS (4) OLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS (7) OLS (8) 2SLS (9) 2SLS
trust pat91 pat00 trust pat91 pat00 trust pat91 pat00
instPC 0.559
(0.183)***
[0.303]*
literacy 0.682
(0.230)***
[0.363]*
univPC 0.164
(0.096)*
[0.095]*
trust 0.573 0.398 0.859 0.638 0.407 0.717
(0.231)** (0.189)** (0.303)*** (0.243)** (0.359) (0.445)
[0.179]*** [0.227] [0.240]*** [0.080]*** [0.419] [0.441]
R&Dintns 0.072 0.247 0.262 0.068 0.210 0.230 0.130 0.269 0.220
(0.102) (0.062)*** (0.063)*** (0.103) (0.099)** (0.079)*** (0.103) (0.079)*** (0.098)**
[0.041] [0.049]** [0.059]*** [0.048] [0.101]* [0.060]*** [0.072]* [0.102]** [0.096]**
educ 0.041 0.188 0.167 0.053 0.162 0.146 0.046 0.202 0.139
(0.084) (0.062)*** (0.051)*** (0.084) (0.079)** (0.064)** (0.089) (0.061)*** (0.076)*
[0.057] [0.049]*** [0.039]*** [0.071] [0.044]*** [0.056]** [0.086] [0.065]*** [0.082]
Constant 2.415 -1.141 -0.610 1.052 -1.893 -1.240 2.593 -0.581 -0.462
(0.736)*** (0.776) (0.637) (0.735) (1.008)* (0.811) (0.714)*** (0.580) (0.717)
[0.265]*** [0.436]** [0.620] [0.430]** [0.640]** [0.191]*** [0.080]*** [0.638] [0.653]
Hausman 3.52 2.10 12.13 8.69 0.28 3.67
(0.064)* (0.150) (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.594) (0.058)*
F-test 3.40 3.54 2.93
(0.080)* (0.082)* (0.110)*
N 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.62 0.80 0.86 0.61 0.68 0.78 0.59 0.84 0.74
Adj R sqr 0.54 0.76 0.83 0.54 0.62 0.74 0.51 0.81 0.69
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All the regressions include country dummies. Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous. F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
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Table 8: Stability of the growth regressions
no of left right fract. fract. fract. of fract. of
regress. mean std. confid. confid. of (-) of (+) signf. (-) signf. (+)
appeared value dev. interv. interv. values values values values Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6
trust 4,090 0.029 0.004 0.028 0.030 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.79 YES YES NO NO YES 0.97
educ 4,090 0.019 0.006 0.017 0.020 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.07 NO YES NO NO YES 0.88
gdppc90 4,090 -0.194 0.010 -0.196 -0.192 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 YES YES YES YES YES 0.00
urban 4,090 0.018 0.006 0.017 0.020 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.34 NO YES NO NO YES 0.93
help 407 0.048 0.008 0.045 0.051 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.61 YES YES NO NO YES 0.96
opinion 407 0.062 0.008 0.060 0.065 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES NO YES YES 1.00
agremp 407 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 YES YES NO YES YES 0.00
indemp 407 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 YES YES NO NO YES 0.94
The dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP 1990-02. The fixed independent variables are gdppc90, educ, trust, urban and country dummies.
Test 1: Strong sign test (all equal sign passed?)
Test 2: Weak sign test (90% equal sign passed?)
Test 3: Strong extreme bounds test (all significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 4: Weak extreme bounds test (90% significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 5: Weighted extreme bounds test (90% significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 6: Cumulative density function test: A variable passes the test at 10%significance level if the value for the test score is less than 0.10 or higher than 0.90.
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Table 9: Stability of the innovation regressions
no of left right fract. fract. fract. of fract. of
regress. mean std. confid. confid. of (-) of (+) signf. (-) signf. (+)
appeared value dev. interv. interv. values values values values Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6
trust 4,090 0.205 0.021 0.200 0.209 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES YES YES YES 1.00
educ 4,090 0.220 0.034 0.213 0.227 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES YES YES YES 1.00
R&Dintns 4,090 0.288 0.025 0.282 0.293 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES YES YES YES 1.00
skill 407 0.396 0.091 0.363 0.429 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES NO YES YES 1.00
help 407 0.276 0.042 0.261 0.292 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.96 YES YES NO YES YES 0.99
opinion 407 0.281 0.063 0.258 0.305 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES NO YES YES 1.00
agremp 407 -0.033 0.003 -0.035 -0.032 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 YES YES YES YES YES 0.00
indemp 407 0.030 0.003 0.028 0.031 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 YES YES YES YES YES 1.00
The dependent variable is the patent applications in 1991. The fixed independent variables are R&Dintns, educ, trust, and country dummies.
Test 1: Strong sign test (all equal sign passed?)
Test 2: Weak sign test (90% equal sign passed?)
Test 3: Strong extreme bounds test (all significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 4: Weak extreme bounds test (90% significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 5: Weighted extreme bounds test (90% significant and equal sign passed?)
Test 6: Cumulative density function test: A variable passes the test at 10%significance level if the value for the test score is less than 0.10 or higher than 0.90.
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Table 10: Social capital, innovation and growth (3SLS Estimates)
(1)OLS (2)3SLS (3) (4) (5)
growth growth growth pat91 trust
gdppc90 -0.228 -0.285 -0.279 0.412
[-1.046] [-1.309] [-1.280] (0.096)***
(0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)***
pat91 0.090 0.194 0.191
[0.413] [0.890] [0.876]
(0.024)*** (0.062)*** (0.063)***
trust 0.016 0.034 0.025 0.724
[0.073] [0.158] [0.114] (0.149)***
(0.014) (0.052) (0.053)
educ 0.002 -0.019 -0.017 0.174 -0.098
[0.007] [-0.089] [-0.079] (0.062)*** (0.085)
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
urban 0.032 0.050 0.044 -0.143
[0.148] [0.229] [0.202] (0.048)***
(0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
R&Dintns 0.228 -0.037
(0.076)*** (0.088)
univPC 0.165
(0.056)***
literacy 0.501
(0.127)***
instPC 0.353
(0.113)***
constant 0.374 0.513 0.519 -1.538 0.335
[-0.596] [0.435] [0.075] (0.637) (0.435)
(0.094)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)***
N 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.68
Standard errors in parentheses. Standardized coefficients in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All the regressions include country dummies. Column (2) presents only the 3SLS results for the growth
equation when trust equation do not include country dummies.
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